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BATSON v. KENTUCKY: THE COURT'S RESPONSE
TO THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATORY
USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Peremptory challenges have long been a part of the American legal system. The
use of the challenge to eliminate a discrete group ofpersons from a petit jury has been
challenged in both state and federal courts. Some courts have followed Swain v.
Alabama, holding that such use does not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment Other courts, however, have held that such use violates the
sixth amendment This Note discusses the Supreme Court's resolution of this conflict
in Batson v. Kentucky.
INTRODUCTION
IN 1965, THE Supreme Court of the United States decided Swain
v. Alabama.1 Swain established a method for determining whether
the use of peremptory challenges2 to eliminate a specific group from
a jury panel violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' Unfortunately, this method had proven virtually use-
less for most criminal defendants. Prior to Batson v. Kentucky,5
most jurisdictions followed Swain;6 others, however, rejected it, rea-
soning in part that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
violates the sixth amendment.7
In 1986, the Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Batson.
Prior to Batson, the main deviations from Swain were through state
constitutions or the post-Swain changes in sixth amendment doc-
trine.' The Court in Batson, however, directly addressed the equal
protection rationale of Swain, and held the practice of striking black
1. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
2. A peremptory challenge is a statutory right to eliminate a party from sitting on a
jury without having to state a reason for the elimination. Id. at 220; J. VAN DYKE, JURY
SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS
140 (1977).
3. See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
4. In only two cases has a defendant succeeded in passing the Swain test: State v.
Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) and State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979). See
infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
5. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
6. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1984) ("Most [jurisdictions] have adhered to
the Swain test. .. ").
7. Id. The exceptions were California, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Florida, New
York and the Second Circuit. See infra notes 51, 87, 93, 101, 112 and cases cited therein.
8. See infra notes 57-120 and accompanying text.
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jurors for a discriminatory purpose in a single case to violate equal
protection. Part I of this Note examines Swain and the criticisms
that it has engendered.9 Part II sets forth the state court decisions
which have deviated from Swain.'0 Part III examines some of the
reasons that changes in this area have not spread widely.II Part IV
looks at the application of sixth amendment doctrine to peremptory
challenges; 2 Part V compares this approach with the decision in
Batson. 13
In Batson, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to
strike all the potential black jurors, empanelling an all-white jury.
The petitioner objected at the time and after his conviction argued
the issue on appeal to the state supreme court.'4 Petitioner did not
attack the Swain holding directly under the equal protection clause;
rather he argued in accordance with state and lower federal court
reasoning that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges vio-
lated his sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a cross-sec-
tion of the community, and also that the facts of his case indeed met
the nearly impossible Swain standard. 5
The Supreme Court chose to modify the equal protection analy-
sis of Swain and to hold that under the equal protection clause a
defendant could establish an unconstitutional use of peremptory
challenges based on the facts of his case alone. The "defendant first
must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and
that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire members of the defendant's race.' 16
The defendant must then show that the peremptory challenge is
inherently susceptible of abuse-which is virtually always assumed.
Finally, the defendant must show, on the basis of the use of the
challenges and "other relevant circumstances" that the use of the
peremptories had a racial motivation. This established a prima fa-
cie case; the burden of rebuttal then falls on the state.' 7
In order to assess the impact of this recent holding, it is neces-
sary to analyze the Swain case and the difficulties found in it by the
state and lower federal courts.
9. See infra notes 18-56 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 57-120 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 135-177 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 178-206 and accompanying text.
14. 106 S. Ct. at 1715.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1723 (citation omitted).
17. Id.
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I. SWAIN v ALABAMA AND LOWER COURT DECISIONS
A. Swain v. Alabama18
Swain v. Alabama 19 was the leading case for two decades con-
cerning the rights of a minority defendant to challenge jury selec-
tion procedures. In Swain, a black defendant was convicted of rape
and sentenced to death by an all-white jury.2 The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,21 and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.22
Swain pressed three claims of error before the Supreme Court.
First, he claimed that blacks were improperly underrepresented on
jury panels throughout Talladega County, Alabama.23 Second, he
claimed that at his trial, blacks were improperly excluded from the
jury, and that the state's system of jury panel selection facilitated
this result by limiting the number of blacks on the jury panel.24
Finally, he alleged that the state maintained a systematic practice of
invidious discrimination, with the result that "there never has been
a Negro on a petit jury in either a civil or a criminal case in Tal-
ladega County ... "25
On his first claim, concerning the lack of blacks on the trial
jury,26 the Court held that there is an initial presumption of proper
use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor.27 Moreover, "[t]he
presumption is not overcome. . . by allegations that in the case at
hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they were
removed because they were Negroes." 28 Therefore, Swain's motion
to strike the trial jury had been properly denied below.29
As for Swain's second claim, based on the racial composition of
the jury panel,"0 the Court held that a criminal defendant "is not
constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate number of his
18. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 203.
21. Swain v. State, 275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 368 (1963).
22. 377 U.S. 915 (1964).
23. 380 U.S. at 205.
24. Id at 210-11 n.6.
25. Id at 222-23.
26. Id. at 210.
27. "The presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the
State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court." Id. at
222.
28. Id
29. Id.
30. Id. at 205.
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race on the jury which tries him nor on the venire or jury roll from
which petit juries are drawn."31 A jury panel need not reflect the
"proportionate strength" of every group in a community, and the
alleged underrepresentation of blacks on the jury panel was not
great enough to prove purposeful discrimination.32
In ruling on Swain's third claim, the Court distinguished be-
tween (1) a claim of discrimination based on the facts of a single
case, and (2) a claim based on alleged discrimination in case after
case. In the first situation, the Court held that the presumption of
proper use could not be overcome based on the facts of any one
case. 3 In the second situation, however, the Court stated that the
presumption of proper use could possibly be overcome by evidence
that the state had never allowed a black to sit on any trial jury.34
The Court then turned to the facts of the case.
Swain alleged that no black had ever sat on a trial jury in Tal-
ladega County.35 However, the evidence "[did] not with any ac-
ceptable degree of clarity, show when, how often, and under what
circumstances the prosecutor alone ha[d] been responsible for strik-
ing those Negroes who ha[d] appeared on petit jury panels ....
Since the striking of jurors involves both state officials and defense
counsel, state participation needed to be shown before there would
be an "inference of systematic discrimination on the part of the
state."'37 Swain did not show the requisite amount of state partici-
pation,38 so he failed to carry his burden of proof on that issue.39
This final portion of the Swain opinion appears to be important.
It grants criminal defendants the right to challenge a discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges. However, there is a heavy burden of
proof on a defendant who seeks to vindicate that right-proof that a
prosecutor, at least in a series of cases, was responsible for the strik-
ing of black panel members.' It is not surprising that the right
announced in Swain has rarely been vindicated.4"
31. Id. at 208 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 208-09.
33. Id. at 221-22. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
34. "If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal case,
the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome." 380 U.S. at 223-24.
35. Id. at 222-23.
36. Id. at 224-25.
37. Id. at 226-27.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 225-26.
40. Id. at 226-27.
41. Sullivan, Deterring the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 477, 484 n.2 (1984); Comment, Justice Ignored: The Discriminatory Use of Peremp-
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B. Criticisms of Swain
Among the criticisms of Swain,42 the most important for liti-
gants was that which illustrated the difficulty that a criminal de-
fendant had in winning.43 In only two cases prior to Batson had a
criminal defendant succeeded in obtaining relief by showing a sys-
tematic past practice. In one of those cases, the prosecutor admit-
ted that "solely on the basis of race and without examination as to
the individual's particular qualifications .. .he consistently ex-
cuse[d] black veniremen . ..when the defendant himself [was]
black."" The second case involved the same prosecutor, and a
great deal of evidence concerning discrimination was introduced
against him.4 Thus, Swain gave aggrieved defendants one avenue
of relief, while blocking that same avenue to almost all traffic.4 6
A second criticism of Swain was that by requiring a defendant
to prove a systematic past practice, only the later defendants in a
series of cases will be able to get judicial relief.47 Thus, the constitu-
tional right granted in Swain was distributed unequally.48
tory Challenges, 53 UMKC L. REv. 446, 451 (1985); see also Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212,
1220 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 3546 (1984) ("Winning Swain claims are ex-
ceedingly rare.").
42. For a collection of some of the critical literature inspired by Swain, see Note, Limit-
ing the Peremptory Challenge: The Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J.
1715 (1977); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 476-77 n.11, 387 N.E.2d 499, 510 n.11
(1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 487, 612 P.2d 716 (1980).
43. See supra note 41; cf Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1720-21 ("Since this interpretation of
Swain has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, prosecutors' peremptory chal-
lenges are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." (footnote omitted)).
44. State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (La. 1979).
45. State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979). Testimony of two attorneys, one of
whom was the defense attorney in Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, indicated that the prosecutor
constantly used peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from petit juries. 371 So. 2d at 752.
On the other hand, even where a systematic practice has been shown, dicta in Swain-
indicating that prosecutors may use the peremptory strike based on a real or imagined parti-
ality, 380 U.S. at 220-had been used to justify denying relief. See, eg., Ridley v. State, 475
S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (a number of witnesses testified it was a typical
practice to strike black jurors whenever defendant was black; held, the burden of proof under
Swain not met).
46. Cf. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1720-21 (citing the "crippling burden of proof"); see also
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 287, 583 P.2d 748, 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 909-10 (1978)
("It demeans the Constitution to declare a fundamental personal right under that charter and
at the same time make it virtually impossible for an aggrieved citizen to exercise that right.").
47. Andrews v. State, 438 So. 2d 480, 481 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09.
48. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09; cf. Batson, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4429 ("For evidentiary requirements to dictate that 'several must suffer discrimi-
nation' before one could object ... would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection
for all.").
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Another criticism of Swain was based on the fact that defend-
ants generally have great difficulty in obtaining sufficient evidence
of past practices to prove their case under Swain. For instance, one
court had observed that: (1) cost can deter indigent defendants
from seeking necessary data; (2) a judge is unlikely to grant a con-
tinuance in the midst of jury selection to allow time for research;
and (3) no convenient source of necessary information exists. 9
Finally, it had been suggested that recent decisions concerning
the sixth amendment have undermined Swain." One such decision
was Duncan v. Louisiana,"' which incorporated the sixth amend-
ment right to an impartial jury into the fourteenth amendment. 2
Another was Taylor v. Louisiana,13 which held that under the sixth
amendment, state jury panels must reflect "a fair cross section of
the community," and entire "identifiable segments" of a community
may not be deliberately underrepresented.5 4 Thus, there appeared
to be a conflict between Swain and Taylor."
Indeed, the petitioner in Batson asserted as his basis the sixth
amendment.56 He had little alternative in the state supreme court,
because an equal protection challenge would have certainly lost
under Swain. However, the United States Supreme Court directly
attacked the equal protection analysis of Swain. Thus, the Batson
court accomplished directly what lower courts had sought to ac-
complish indirectly. It is worth comparing the goals for change
perceived by the lower courts with the result in Batson.
49. Id. at 285-86, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
50. Swain was decided in 1965, prior to the incorporation of the sixth amendment into
the fourteenth amendment in Taylor v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Also, Swain was
decided upon equal protection grounds. 380 U.S. at 203-04. A sixth amendment claim, it
was thought, may require a different result. See infra notes 135-77 and accompanying text.
See also Sullivan, supra note 41, at 489; cf. Comment, supra note 41, at 451 (noting that
commentators have indicated that Duncan v. Louisiana and Taylor v. Louisiana had "ren-
dered Swain constitutionally infirm"); accord Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 767 (6th Cir.
1985).
51. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
52. Id. at 148-50.
53. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
54. Id. at 530-31.
55. The apparent conflict is not in analysis; rather, it is in outcome. Swain was decided
upon equal protection grounds, 380 U.S. at 203-04, and Taylor was decided upon sixth
amendment grounds, 419 U.S. at 525.
56. 106 S. Ct. at 1717.
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II. APPROACHES TO CHANGE: STATE COURT DEVIATIONS
FROM SWAIN
A. Wheeler/Soares-Shifting Presumptions
California and Massachusetts were the first jurisdictions to de-
part from Swain, allowing criminal defendants to challenge the use
of peremptory strikes without requiring a showing of systematic dis-
crimination.57 However, the decisions were based on state constitu-
tions 8 rather than the equal protection clause of the federal
constitution. 9
In People v. Wheeler,"° two black defendants were accused of
murdering a white man during a robbery.61 During voir dire, the
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to eliminate all of the
potential black jurors.6' Some of these he did not question at all on
voir dire, and others had given answers indicating that they could
make an impartial judgment.63
The court developed a test for analyzing a claim of improper use
of a peremptory challenge. Initially, there exists a presumption of
proper use of peremptory challenges." 4 However, that presumption
is rebuttable by either party upon a showing that (1) several of the
challenged jurors belong to a discrete group, and (2) there is a likeli-
hood of their being challenged for no other reason than their group
membership.6 5 If this is shown, the burden shifts to the other party
to show that the reason for the peremptory challenge relates to indi-
vidual qualities of the challenged juror and not to group associa-
57. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Com-
monwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979).
58. In both cases, the state constitution provided for a right to a jury composed of a fair
cross section of the community. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 899-900; Soares, 377 Mass. at 477-78, 387 N.E.2d at 510-11; cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (the sixth amendment provides a right to a jury panel composed of a fair
cross section of the community).
59. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 263, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893; Soares, 377 Mass.
at 473, 387 N.E.2d at 508.
The Wheeler court did not try to distinguish Swain or claim that Swain should be over-
ruled; rather, the court merely stated that the state constitution provided more protection
than did the United States Constitution. 22 Cal. 3d at 285-86, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 908-09. The court in Soares, on the other hand, took note of the criticisms of Swain, 377
Mass. at 476-77 n. 11, 387 N.E.2d at 510 n. 11, and consciously took the opportunity to fash-
ion a new rule. Iad at 477 n.12, 387 N.E.2d at 510 n.12.
60. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
61. Id. at 262-63, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 278, 583 P.2d at 762-63, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
65. Id. at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
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tion 6  Should the trial judge find improper use, the judge must
dismiss the jurors, quash the panel, and begin again with a new
panel.67
In applying the test to the facts of the case, the court indicated
that the proper use of a peremptory challenge is to remove a per-
ceived juror bias which is specific to the case being tried.6 8 The use
of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole
ground of a perceived group viewpoint violates a defendant's right
to a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the commu-
nity.69 Since the evidence in the case showed that all of the prosecu-
tor's peremptory challenges were used to eliminate blacks from the
jury, the court ruled that the defendant had successfully rebutted
the presumption of proper use.70  Therefore, it was error for the
trial court not to require the state prosecutor to show that the per-
emptory challenges were properly used.71
66. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
67. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. For a concise description of the
Wheeler/Soares system, see Comment, supra note 41, at 453.
68. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
69. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
70. Id. at 283, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
71. Id. One commentator, taking the view that a jury should be made up of individually
bias-free jurors, has criticized Wheeler's reliance on the fair cross section requirement. Com-
ment, Is There a Place for the Challenge of Racially Based Peremptory Challenges?, 1984
DET. C.L. REv. 703, 705-10. This commentator analyzes Wheeler as having two possible
meanings: (1) allowing challenges based on group bias deprives a jury of those members best
able to decide the case on the merits because group bias assists truth finding by providing jury
members with "unique perspectives"; or (2) overall impartiality is achieved by including indi-
viduals with countervailing biases on a jury. Id. at 715-16. In either case, the result is "ab-
surd." Id. at 717. Counsel should be able to remove jurors with any sort of bias; so long as
twelve bias-free individuals sit on the jury, the defendant is not harmed. Id.
This criticism relies on the assumption that attitudes jurors may have as group members
are "biases" of precisely the same type as those case-specific biases desirable to eliminate from
the jury. Wheeler can be read to support such a view, 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 902 ("[The] purpose . . . is to achieve overall impartiality by allowing the
interaction of the diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences.
Manifestly, if jurors are struck simply because they hold these very beliefs, such interaction
becomes impossible and the jury will be dominated by the. . . prejudices of the majority.").
However, Wheeler views case-specific bias and group-related viewpoint as two different quali-
ties. Case-specific bias refers to an actual disposition to decide the case in a certain manner,
group-related viewpoint refers to the fact that jurors enter the jury box with different back-
grounds and group experiences. Id. The Wheeler court speaks of group bias not in terms of a
specific bias resulting from group membership, but rather in terms of a bias "presumed" by a
party. As a result of their group memberships, the jurors actually possess "diverse beliefs and
values." Cf Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 767-68 (6th Cir. 1985) (the "model jury" contains
disinterested individual jurors and a representative cross section). District of Columbia Sur-
vey, Trial Court Discretion in Conducting the Voir Dire Subjected to More Stringent Scrutiny:
Cordero v. U.S., 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 1121, 1123 (1984). Another commentator has noted
that both case-specific bias and group viewpoint must be taken into account to conduct an
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Commonwealth v. Soares72 arose from a similar fact situation.
Three blacks had been accused of first degree murder in the killing
of a white man." At voir dire, the state prosecutor peremptorily
challenged twelve of the thirteen black men who were on the jury
panel.74 The thirteenth black was not peremptorily challenged, and
he sat on the jury." The defendants were found guilty, and an ap-
peal followed.76
The Soares court began with a discussion of Swain,7 7 but it de-
cided to center its analysis on the state constitution's "right to trial
before a jury of peers . 7.8.."I' After analyzing that right,79 the
court developed a test for measuring whether peremptory chal-
lenges are being used properly. 0 First, there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption of proper use in favor of the party exercising a
peremptory challenge.81 If the attacking party can show "that (1) a
pattern of conduct has developed whereby several [challenged ve-
niremen] are members of a discrete group, and (2) there is a likeli-
hood they are being excluded. . . solely by reason of their group
membership," 2 then the presumption is rebutted.83 "[T]he burden
shifts to the allegedly offending party" to show that group member-
ship is not the reason for exclusion.84
In applying the test to the facts of the case, the court found that
the defendant had successfully rebutted the initial presumption of
proper use,8 5 because twelve of the thirteen black veniremen had
been peremptorily challenged.8 6  Therefore, the burden of proof
shifted to the state to "justify his challenges as predicated [on
effective voir dire. Id. Individual bias should be rooted out as much as possible; but since
voir dire cannot eliminate all varying viewpoints, the presence of a representative cross sec-
tion will ensure a "balanced representation" of conflicting views. Id.
72. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979).
73. Id. at 462-63, 387 N.E.2d at 502-03.
74. Id. at 473, 387 N.E.2d at 508. The thirteen blacks had been considered by the trial
judge to be "indifferent." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 462-63, 387 N.E.2d at 502-03.
77. Id at 474-75, 387 N.E.2d at 509.
78. Id. at 476-77, 387 N.E.2d at 510.
79. Id at 477-85, 387 N.E.2d at 510-14.
80. This test was adapted from and similar to the test in Wheeler. Id at 489-91, 387
N.E.2d at 516-18.
81. Id at 489-90, 387 N.E.2d at 516-17.
82. Id.
83. IM
84. Id at 491, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
85. Id at 490, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
86. Id at 492, 387 N.E.2d at 518.
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proper grounds]."87 Since the trial court did not require the state to
show proper use of the peremptory challenges, there was reversible
error.
88
Although relying on state constitutions, the Wheeler/Soares
courts took notice of the cases which developed the fair cross sec-
tion requirement of jury panels.89 Each court recognized that a de-
fendant is not entitled to a jury of any particular composition. 90
However, both courts recognized the need to protect defendants
from affirmative destruction of the representative nature of the jury
panel through an improper use of peremptory challenges. 91
B. The New Mexico Hybrid
The New Mexico Court of Appeals announced an approach in
which both Swain and Wheeler/Soares coexisted.9" In State v. Cres-
pin,93 the defendant argued that it was error for the trial court to
refuse to require a state prosecutor to give reasons for his peremp-
tory challenge of a single black venireman.9 In rejecting this argu-
ment,95 the court indicated that Swain is the general rule, but that
"certain fact situations [can] arise where the defendant can over-
come the presumption of proper use based entirely on the facts of
his own case." 96
When the use of peremptory challenges is being attacked, a de-
fendant must still present evidence which indicates a systematic ex-
clusion of a group by improper use of peremptory challenges.97
However, this may be done in either of two ways: (1) by presenting
evidence of systematic exclusion from a series of cases, as Swain
required; or (2) by showing that in his own case, persons from a
cognizable group were excluded from the jury for their group asso-
87. Id. at 489-90, 387 N.E.2d at 516-17.
88. Id.
89. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 266-71, 583 P.2d at 755-58, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896-99 (the
cross section doctrine has been incorporated into the state constitution); Soares, 377 Mass. at
478-79, 387 N.E.2d at 510-11 (previous court decisions have made the cross section doctrine
a part of Massachusetts law).
90. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 267-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903; Soares, 377
Mass. at 488, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
91. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903; Soares, 377 Mass.
at 486, 387 N.E.2d at 515.
92. State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980); State v. Davis, 99
N.M. 522, 660 P.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1983).
93. 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980).
94. Id. at 486, 612 P.2d at 716.
95. Id. at 488, 612 P.2d at 718.
96. Id. at 487, 612 P.2d at 717.
97. Id. at 488, 612 P.2d at 718.
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ciation, as Wheeler/Soares allows.9" Thus, both Swain and
Wheeler/Soares were made to coexist.
In State v. Crespin only one black person had been peremptorily
challenged. 99 Therefore, there was no "inference of improper use"
under either approach, and "[t]he presumption of proper use was
not rebutted."' "
C. Florida and New York- Limiting Wheeler
In State v. Neil, 1° the Florida Supreme Court rejected Swain on
state constitutional grounds.1 2 In Neil, a black defendant was
charged with second degree murder in the shooting death of a black
Haitian immigrant. 0 3 In the ensuing voir dire, the prosecutor used
all of his peremptory challenges to eliminate three of the four blacks
who were veniremen. "4 After the third black was excused, the de-
fendant objected on the grounds that the prosecutor's use of the
peremptory challenges "[was] discriminatory and violated [the de-
fendant's] sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury."10
The court denied a motion to strike the jury, but it granted each
side five more peremptory challenges."16 The prosecutor used those
five in an effort to exclude the last black venireman, but he was
unsuccessful." 7 The black venireman eventually sat as an alternate
juror on the jury which convicted the defendant. 1 8
On appeal, the court declined to apply the Swain test. 09 The
court noted that Swain had been the subject of a great deal of criti-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 486, 612 P.2d at 716.
100. Id. at 488, 612 P.2d at 718.
In State v. Davis, 99 N.M. 522, 660 P.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1983), the court reiterated the
approach that it developed in Crespin. Davis, 99 N.M. at 523-24, 660 P.2d at 613-14. How-
ever, the court again found that the defendant failed to show systematic exclusion, id. at 524-
25, 660 P.2d at 614-15, because only one black venireman had been challenged. Id. at 524,
660 P.2d at 614.
101. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
102. Id. at 486. The Florida State Constitution "guarantees the right to an impartial jury
... . Swain... impedes, rather than furthers ... that guarantee.. . . [Therefore...
Swain is no longer to be used . . . when [a state court is] confronted with the allegedly
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges." Id.
103. Id at 482-83.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 486.
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cal literature,11° and that some jurisdictions were deviating from its
test. 11  The Wheeler and Soares decisions were discussed, but the
court opted to adopt a test that was developed in the New York
case of State v. Thompson.1
12
The Neil test is similar to the Wheeler/Soares test:
The initial presumption is that peremptories will be exercised in a
nondiscriminatory manner. A party concerned about the other
side's use of peremptory challenges must make a timely objection
and demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are
members of a distinct racial group and that there is a substantial
likelihood that they have been challenged solely because of their
race. If a party accomplishes this, then the trial court must de-
cide if there is a substantial likelihood that the peremptory chal-
lenges are being exercised solely on the basis of race. If the court
finds no such likelihood, no inquiry may be made of the person
exercising the questioned peremptories . . . . [I]f the court de-
cides that such a likelihood has been shown . . . the burden
shifts to the [other side] to show that the questioned challenges
were not exercised solely because of the prospective juror's race
... . If the party shows that the challenges were based on the
particular case on trial, the parties or witnesses, or characteristics
of the challenged persons other than race, then the inquiry ends
... . On the other hand, if the party has been challenging pro-
spective jurors solely on the basis of race, then the court should
dismiss that jury pool and start voir dire over with a new pool.' 1 3
However, Neil limits the Wheeler/Soares test in two important re-
spects. First, it expressly denies that a party can compel an inquiry
into the use of peremptory challenges merely by showing that a cer-
tain number of minority veniremen have been excluded."' The ob-
110. Id at 483-84.
111. Id. at 484.
112. Id. at 484-87.
In Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1981), a black defendant was
accused of grand larceny and possession of stolen goods. Id. at 88, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 742. At
voir dire, the prosecutor used all of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the trial
jury. Id. Thereafter the defendant moved for a mistrial. Id. The trial judge indicated that
some of the excused veniremen looked to be fair and impartial, but because "'the law [was]
clear'," the motion was denied. Id. at 89, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 742-43. The defendant was found
guilty after a trial, and a second motion for mistrial was denied. Id. at 89-90, 435 N.Y.S.2d at
743.
On appeal, the court looked beyond Swain, id. at 94, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 745, and it devel-
oped the test discussed in Neil. When the new test was applied to the facts of Thompson, the
court found that the trial court had erred in not requiring the prosecution to explain his
peremptory challenges after the defendant had complained. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d at 111,
435 N.Y.S.2d at 755. Therefore, the trial court was reversed and a new trial granted. Id
113. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 486-87 (footnotes omitted). The Thompson case was cited in
Neil, id. at 485-86.
114. Id. at 487, n.10. See also Thompson, 79 A.D.2d at 111, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
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jecting party must show that "there is a strong likelihood that they
have been challenged solely because of their race."115 Second, while
Wheeler/Soares holds that members of any identifiable group may
avail themselves of this right,' 16 Neil applies only when the peremp-
tory challenges being attacked have been used against blacks.11 7
Turning to the facts of the case, the court determined that Neil
had to be granted a new trial. 1 8 The court noted that the trial
court had relied on Swain and did not have the benefit of the new
test.1 19 Since the court could not tell how the trial court would
have decided had the new test been available, the court found that a
new trial was necessary. 2 '
III. REJECTION OF CHANGE IN THE PEREMPTORY SYSTEM
Despite the criticisms, deviations from Swain prior to Batson
had been rare.'21 One possible reason for the sluggish acceptance of
change in this area is attributable to the criticism which had been
leveled against the courts which have deviated from Swain. The
dissent in Wheeler argues that the majority unreasonably extended
to the petit jury rules which were intended to apply only to the jury
panel.122 This is sometimes regarded as mandating a certain jury
composition, 123 an anomaly since the function of jury selection is
not primarily to produce a representative jury, but rather an impar-
tial one.'2 4 The express language of Taylor v. Louisiana, limiting its
holding to jury panels,125 gives this criticism force. Batson, how-
ever, shows that whatever protections the fourteenth amendment
provides persist through the entire criminal proceeding.126
Critics have also argued that scrutiny of the use of peremptory
challenges will destroy the peremptory challenge system. 27 This is
115. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487.
116. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906; Soares, 377 Mass.
at 489-90, 387 N.E.2d at 516-17.
117. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487.
118. Id.
119. Id
120. Id. Although a new trial was granted in Neil, the court indicated that the test would
not otherwise be applied retroactively. Id at 488.
121. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
122. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 292, 583 P.2d at 771, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
123. Id., 148 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
124. Id.
125. 419 U.S. at 538.
126. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1717 n.8.
127. King v. Nassau County, 581 F. Supp. 493, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Note, People v.
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more than a mere reactionary impulse to cling to tradition. Rather,
it is a fear grounded in the fact that two types of challenge exist: for
cause and peremptory.128 Each type of challenge has a specific
function, and the function of a peremptory challenge is to eliminate
bias not reached by the for cause challenge.' 29 In addition, the per-
emptory challenge also supplements the for cause challenge. Prob-
ing questions designed to demonstrate a "for cause" bias may have
the effect of antagonizing a juror. 130 If an antagonized juror is not
removed by the court for cause, an attorney can use a peremptory
challenge. 131 These functions are valuable ones, and if attorneys are
scrutinized when a peremptory is used, then the critics argued that
peremptory challenges will become nothing more than for cause
challenges. 1
32
While the Batson court does not specifically refer to this theory
of the peremptory challenge, it does note the state's argument that
"our holding will eviscerate the fair trial values served by the per-
emptory challenge."' 13 3 The Court rejects this argument, restating
the supremacy of the equal protection clause and asserting that the
holding will strengthen public respect for the criminal justice
system.134
IV. McCRA Y v. ABRAMS: APPLICATION OF SIXTH
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE TO PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
When the Second Circuit became the first federal circuit to devi-
ate from Swain,135 it relied upon the fair cross section requirement
of the sixth amendment. 1
36
Wheeler: Has California Really Assured Impartial Juries by Revision of Peremptory Chal-
lenges?, 1979 DET. C.L. RaV. 529, 539-40 (1979).
128. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 273, 583 P.2d at 759, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 900-01; J. VAN DYKE,
supra note 2, at 140-41.
129. Note, supra note 127, at 540.
130. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d at 106, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
131. Id.
132. See Note, supra note 127, at 539-40.
133. 106 S. Ct. at 1724.
134. Id.
135. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 756 F.2d 277
(1985).
136. 750 F.2d at 1131. More recently, the sixth circuit found McCray persuasive and
held that the use of peremptories in a particular case violated the sixth amendment. Counsel
virtually admired the discrimination. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 770 (6th Cir. 1985)
("The sixth amendment guarantees that a criminal charge will not be tried before a jury that
fails to represent a cross-section of the community as a consequence of a method of jury
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McCray v. Abrams 117 was an appeal by the state from a success-
ful habeas corpus action in federal court which overturned a guilty
verdict against McCray in state court. 138 McCray's first Criminal
trial ended in a hung jury. 139 In preparation for a second trial, the
state prosecutor peremptorily struck seven black veniremen and one
Hispanic venireman, thus eliminating all minority representation
from the jury.1" McCray moved for a mistrial, arguing that "the
prosecutor appeared to be systematically using ...peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks and Hispanics from the jury." 141 The
trial court denied the motion, and McCray went to trial in front of
an all-white jury."' McCray was convicted, 14 3 and the conviction
was upheld by the Court of Appeals of New York, which relied on
Swain.1" A petition for certiorari was denied by the United States
Supreme Court.145
Thereafter, McCray petitioned for habeas relief in federal dis-
trict court, alleging that the state had violated his sixth amendment
right to a trial jury by improperly using peremptory challenges.146
The federal district judge ruled that the sixth amendment required
"judicial scrutiny of discriminatory prosecutorial peremptory chal-
lenges."147 The district judge then decided that the trial judge
should have inquired into the reasons for the peremptory challenges
that were being attacked, and the trial judge's failure to do so was
grounds for a new trial.148
The appeals court began with a review of both Swain 149 and the
state court cases which had rejected Swain."50 Although noting
that the arguments for rejecting Swain were strong, the court recog-
nized that Swain was controlling as far as an equal protection claim
selection that systematically excludes a cognizable group from jury service."). Both these
cases were decided prior to Batson.
137. 750 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984).
138. Id at 1114.
139. Id at 1115. At the first trial, three blacks sat on the jury, and two of them were
among the three votes for acquittal. Id. at 1115, 1118.
140. Id. at 1115.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id at 1115-16.
145. Id at 1116. See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
146. 750 F.2d at 1116.
147. Id. at 1117.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1118-20.
150. Id at 1122-23.
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was concerned.' 5 1 On the other hand, the court realized that Swain
did not control the outcome of a sixth amendment claim, because
Swain was decided upon equal protection grounds rather than sixth
amendment grounds.152
Turning to sixth amendment analysis, the court noted that the
"Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part that '[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial, by an impartial jury. . . .153 The Supreme Court had
interpreted that provision on many occasions, and "the touchstone
of each analysis has been whether the practice in question deprived
the defendant of the possibility of a jury [panel] that represent[s] a
cross section of the community." '154 Admittedly, this does not
mean that a defendant is entitled to a jury of any particular compo-
sition; 155 however, the court did not believe that such a fact neces-
sarily implied that the sixth amendment does not apply to petit
juries.' 56
A jury panel serves an important function by providing a pool
from which a petit jury can be drawn. 57 However, the venire itself
"takes no action and makes no decisions."'1' Therefore, "[i]f there
is a sixth amendment requirement that the venire represent a fair
cross section of the community, it must logically be because it is
important that the defendant have the chance that the petit jury will
be similarly constituted."' 59 This "chance" is the "fair and undis-
torted" possibility that cross-sectional representation may survive
onto a petit jury, 60 and it is guaranteed by the sixth amendment.' 61
151. Id. at 1123-24.
152. Id. at 1124. Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533-34 (1975) (a decision based
on due process or equal protection grounds does not control the outcome of a sixth amend-
ment claim). It is interesting to note that both McCray and the state were claiming that
Swain was no longer good law. Id. at 1123-24.
153. 750 F.2d at 1124 (quoting the sixth amendment). The sixth amendment was made
applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
154. 750 F.2d at 1124-25. The court discussed the following cases: Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (six-person juries in noncapital cases upheld as sufficient in size to "pro-
vide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community"); Ballew
v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five-person jury struck down as not able to fairly represent
the community); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (statute exempting women from
jury service unless a woman specifically requests to be included struck down as unreasonably
restricting opportunity for jury drawn from fair cross section of community). 750 F.2d at
1124-28.
155. 750 F.2d at 1128 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).
156. 750 F.2d at 1128.
157. Id. at 1128-29.
158. Id.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. Id.
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On the other hand, peremptory challenges are not constitutionally
based. 62 Therefore, when there is a conflict between the two, ".
the peremptory challenge. . . must yield .... ,163
From this point, the court turned to the scope of analysis which
a court should use in examining a challenged use of peremptory
challenges. The sixth amendment protects criminal defendants in
"'all criminal prosecutions.' 164 Thus, courts are required under
the sixth amendment "to decide each case on the basis of the acts or
practices complained of in that very case, and not require the de-
fendant to show, as [in] Swain. . .that those acts or practices have
had undesirable effects in case after case." 165
After defining the scope of analysis, the court looked at various
guiding principles behind the sixth amendment. First, the court in-
dicated that "the goal of jury selection is to assure that each juror is
free from bias." 166 Next, the court stated that the notion "that all
persons who share an attribute. . . will ipso facto view matters in
the same way. . . [is] fallacious and pernicious." '167 Finally, the
court noted that the responsibility of a state prosecutor is to "see
that justice is done, and justice is best served by a jury that repre-
sents a cross section of the community . .. 68 Combining these
three principles, the court determined that the sixth amendment
"allows the prosecution to exercise its peremptory challenges to ex-
cuse jurors [who have a bias specific to the case]; but it forbids the
exercise of such challenges . . . solely on the basis of their racial
161. "[T"he state is not permitted by the Sixth Amendment to restrict unreasonably the
possibility that the petit jury will comprise a fair cross section of the community." Id. at
1129. In support of this proposition, the court cited Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978)
(five-person jury violates sixth amendment not because of an improper venire, but because of
unreasonably low likelihood of such jury comprising cross section of community); and
Whitherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (statute allowing for cause challenge of persons
opposed to death penalty invalidated). 750 F.2d at 1129.
162. Id. at 1130.
163. Id.
164. Id (emphasis supplied by the court).
165. Id. The court did not understand why the equal protection clause protects only the
later defendants in a series of cases, as Swain provides. Id. However, the court was certain
that the sixth amendment did not require a defendant to look for evidence beyond the facts of
his own case. Id. The Batson decision arrived at the same result, relying on Washington v.
Davis, 492 U.S. 252 (1977), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 426 U.S.
229 (1976), for the proposition that discriminatory impact alone can demonstrate an uncon-
stitutional purpose; and that discrimination can be shown on the facts of the plaintiff's case
alone. 106 S. Ct. at 1722.
166. 750 F.2d at 1131. "By this we mean that he or she is likely to be able to decide the
case solely on the basis of the evidence before the jury." Id. (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 219).
167. 750 F.2d at 1131.
168. Id.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
affiliation."' 169
Once the court determined that Swain did not control the out-
come of a sixth amendment claim, a new test had to be developed
for judging an attack on the use of peremptory challenges. To do
so, the court "adapt[ed] the Supreme Court's test for the establish-
ment of a prima facie case of a Sixth Amendment violation with
respect to the venire . . . ,'o Thus, "to establish a prima facie
violation of his right to the possibility of a fair cross section in the
petit jury, the defendant must show that in his case, (1) the [ex-
cluded] group . ..is a cognizable group in the community, and
(2) there is a substantial likelihood that the challenges leading to
this exclusion have been made on the basis of. . .group affiliation
rather than [a bias specific to the case]." '17 1 If the defendant makes
such a showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to show that the
challenges were exercised for a proper reason.172 If the prosecutor's
reasons "appear to be genuine," then the court should accept those
reasons, and voir dire will continue. 17' However, if the court deter-
mines that the prosecutor's reasons are pretextual, or are inade-
quate to rebut the prima facie case, then "the court should declare a
mistrial and a new jury should be selected from a new panel."' 174
In applying this test to the facts of the case, the court concluded
that McCray had established a prima facie case of improper use of
the peremptory challenge. 175 Therefore, the burden was on the
prosecutor to show that the peremptory challenges were properly
used. 176 Since the district court did not give the prosecutor the op-
portunity to rebut the prima facie showing, the court remanded the
case to give the prosecutor that opportunity. 177
V. TOWARD A BETTER PROCEDURE FOR INQUIRY
INTO THE CHALLENGE
A. Substantive Goals
The preceding analysis of lower court cases points out the short-
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)).
171. Id. at 1131-32.
172. Id. at 1132. However, "the prosecutor need not show a reason rising to the level of
cause." Id.
173. Id. The trial judge has "the responsibility of assessing the genuineness of the prose-
cutor's [reasons]." Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1133.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1134-35.
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comings of the law in this area prior to Batson. The experience of
these lower courts suggests desirable goals for change. The remain-
der of this Note will describe these goals and analyze the success of
the Batson court in meeting them.
Above all, the experience of the lower courts demanded that a
new rule should, unlike the rule in Swain, provide a navigable ave-
nue of relief for all aggrieved parties, and it should not require them
to gather facts from outside their own case.178 The Batson court
unequivocally met this goal and instructed courts that proof of dis-
criminatory use of the challenge can be made based solely on the
criminal defendant's own case.1  This derives from the equal pro-
tection standard articulated in Washington v. Davis.18° A law does
not violate equal protection merely because it has a disparate im-
pact; a discriminatory purpose must also appear. 18' Discriminatory
purpose can appear from the application of a facially neutral law in
one case alone; for instance, the combination of a disproportionate
racial impact and a racially non-neutral selection procedure would
suffice to show a violation.
1 8 2
When examining a challenged use of peremptory challenges, a
court should scrutinize the attorney's good faith in making the chal-
lenge. In that way, the court can avoid transforming the peremp-
tory challenge into a type of "for cause" challenge.1 8 3 Batson sets
forth the following standard: while "the prosecutor's explanation
need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause," the prosecutor must articulate a "neutral explanation" for
the challenge "related to the particular case to be tried."18 a Thus,
once the criminal defendant has established an inference of im-
proper use, the prosecutor must affirmatively show a good reason
for the challenge; mere generalized assertions of good faith will not
suffice. This represents a fairly substantial curtailment of the per-
emptory challenge in favor of the individual's rights.
B. Court Procedures for Scrutinizing Peremptories
Prior to making any inquiry, a court must define a protected
178. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
179. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1722-23.
180. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
181. Id. at 239.
182. Ido
183. See, eg., People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1983)
(proferred reason for excluding minorities equally applicable to nonminorities who were not
excluded).
184. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
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group. However, the lower courts' struggles with the issue suggest
that care must be taken when doing so. The protected group should
not be defined so broadly that actual bias cannot properly be ex-
cluded, nor so narrowly as to derogate from the protection of mi-
nority jurors. Courts before Batson fell into three general categories
in defining the protected group.
1. The Broad Rule
Wheeler defines the protected group as one cognizable within
the meaning of the fair cross section rule.185 Thus, Wheeler adopts
the rule for the jury pool and the panel cases. Similarly, the Massa-
chusetts and New Mexico courts follow Wheeler in widely defining
the protected group. 
186
2. Limiting the Protected Group
The Florida court in State v. Neil, 87 following the restrictive
rule of the Thompson case,188 places the most severe limitation on
the protected group. The rule as announced in Neil applies only on
behalf of blacks; 89 furthermore, a showing of a large number of
challenges alone does not suffice to rebut the presumption of proper
use. 1
90
These cases permit a wide-ranging exclusion of jurors because of
their group affiliation so long as they are not blacks. Thus, these
cases might not impede the exclusion of specific bias; however, they
may derogate from the preservation of groups other than blacks on
the jury. Other groups besides blacks can fall victim to discrimina-
tory exclusions.
185. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
186. Soares, 377 Mass. at 438 n.33, 387 N.E.2d at 516 n.33. The New Mexico cases do
not define the nature of the protected group, but they adopt the Wheeler "cognizable group"
standard. State v. Davis, 99 N.M. 522, 660 P.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Crespin, 94
N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980).
187. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
188. People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 205, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981).
189. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487. Accord Thompson, 79 A.D.2d at 106, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 752
("[O]ur Constitution requires that petit juries be selected in a manner that permits the exclu-
sion of blacks only by means of either random selection or the challenging of prospective
jurors, on the basis of actual or perceived partiality, which relates not to race alone .. ").
190. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487 n.10; Thompson, 79 A.D.2d at 110, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 755
("[A] black juror may have been peremptorily challenged, and properly so, because of some
idiosyncracy which does not appear on the cold record, but which was apparent to anyone
who was intently observing the conduct of the voir dire"). But cf. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280,
583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (a party may overcome the presumption of proper use
of the challenge by showing that his opponent has struck all the members of a group or has
used his peremptories disproportionately against group members).
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3. A Middle Approach
A New York state trial court, ruling on an interlocutory motion
for a mistrial, has suggested a middle approach. 9' This rule would
trigger scrutiny whenever the challenged jurors are of the same
group as the criminal defendant.19
The Court in Batson, in accordance with equal protection prin-
ciples, extended protection to defendants who are members of "cog-
nizable racial groups" protected under the equal protection clause.
Members of these groups undoubtedly form the vast majority of
potential jurors who are excluded for discriminatory reasons. Yet
in the special setting of a trial, the prosecution might similarly ex-
clude jurors who, for instance, are of the same religion as the de-
fendant.193 Arguably, defendants in such a situation should receive
protection as well. Further development in this area is possible.
C. Circumstances Triggering the Inquiry
Once a party shows that peremptory challenges have been used
to eliminate a specific group from the jury, a second question arises:
What other trigger facts, if any, must be shown before a court can
find a prima facie case of improper use of peremptories? The
Wheeler shifting presumption rule and the New Mexico hybrid rule
advocated scrutiny based solely on the number of challenges di-
rected at group members alone; 194 the more limited rule set forth in
Neil required more.' 95
Batson requires simply a showing that members of the defend-
ant's race have been excluded from the jury, plus undefined addi-
tional circumstances showing an improper motive.' 96 These may be
a pattern of challenges, or statements made during voir dire. The
Court leaves the trial judge discretion to establish the motive under-
lying the use of the challenge.
D. Review by Shifting Presumptions
Wheeler had established a system of shifting rebuttable pre-
sumptions which has been followed in subsequent cases in other
191. People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
192. Id. at 276, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
193. Cf Kagan, supra note 191.
194. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. See also Crespin,
94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716.
195. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 485-86.
196. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
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states.19 7 There is an initial presumption of proper use.' 98 Upon
rebuttal of this presumption,1 99 a presumption of improper use then
shifts to favor the party objecting to the use of the peremptory chal-
lenge. °" The striking party then has the burden of showing proper
use.20 ' Batson adopts the same procedure. 20 2
The initial presumption of propriety should discourage the in-
terposition of weak motions filed for purposes of delay. If the evi-
dence is strong, however, the initial presumptions can be rebutted.
Rebuttal of the initial presumptions then raises a presumption in
favor of the objecting party. This shift in presumptions in turn
guarantees the party using the challenge an opportunity to be heard.
E. Remedies
In Batson, the trial court had simply rejected the defendant's
objection to the use of challenges, without any sort of hearing.20 3
The Court remanded to the trial court for a determination of
whether there was purposeful discrimination and, if so, a reversal of
the conviction.2' Thus, the Court did not have occasion to con-
sider possible alternative remedies at the time of empanelling the
jury. Some suggestions derived from commentators and the experi-
ence of the lower courts follow.
Courts that have rejected Swain have all ruled that the applica-
ble remedy is the one developed in Wheeler: dismissal of the jurors
already selected, and the calling of a new panel.20 5 However, this
ignores the fact that the judge attending or directing voir dire may
be able to prevent improper use without having to resort to the most
drastic remedy. For example, in order to effectively exclude a
group, a party must have a sufficient number of challenges to do so.
Thus, one commentator has suggested the possibility of limiting the
number of challenges available to a party making improper
197. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906; see supra
notes 57-100 and accompanying text.
198. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
199. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
200. Id
201. Id at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
202. 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
203. Id at 1725.
204. Id.
205. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906; accord Soares,
377 Mass. at 491, 387 N.E.2d at 517; McCray, 750 F.2d at 1133 (Because McCray was mak-
ing a collateral attack on a state verdict, he could not get this relief; however, "a mistrial
should have been ordered and the jury selection process begun afresh.").
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strikes.2 °6 Similarly, some jurisdictions may allow a very limited
number of challenges, making it difficult for a party effectively to
exclude a group. In these states, perhaps adding to the objecting
party's challenges may suffice.2"7 Of course, in some cases, begin-
ning again with a new jury panel may be the only effective remedy.
All such options should be available.
VI. CONCLUSION
For over 20 years, Swain v. Alabama20 8 dominated the law re-
garding the use of peremptory challenges. However, as critical
literature20 9 and lower court decisions recognized, the Swain rule
led to injustice and the denial of equal protection. Batson re-
sponded to the need for change by overturning Swain on equal pro-
tection grounds.
The Batson court has met most of the goals for change de-
manded by the experience of the lower courts, particularly by al-
lowing the criminal defendant a chance to prove improper use based
on the facts of his case alone. The Swain requirement that an ag-
grieved defendant adduce facts from outside his own case had led to
the most glaring injustices.21° Other areas, such as the scope of pro-
tection and remedial measures available to trial judges at the time of
voir dire, remain open for further development. Such development
in the constitutional law of peremptory challenges had been stifled
by Swain, but it now seems assured by the decision in Batson.
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